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REsnTUTION-CoNsTRuCT1VE TRUST RELIEF FOR BREACH OF ORAL CoNTRACT To CREATE TRUST IN LAND-Plaintiff mining company sued to impose a constructive trust on mineral interests purchased by the defendant
employee in breach of his oral agreement with the company. The agreement
included a promise to hold any property so acquired in trust for the employer at his election. Ruling that this agreement was unenforceable under
the Oklahoma statute of frauds, the trial court relied on the defendant's
status as an ordinary employee without duties relating to the acquisition
of mineral interests or access to confidential information, and gave judgment for the defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed. Without proof of positive fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, the breach of an oral agreement to
hold land in trust does not give rise to a constructive trust. Amerada
Petroleum Corporation v. Burline, (10th Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 862.
A constructive trust has been defined as the "formula through which the
c;onscience of equity finds expression." 1 In cases involving the statute of
frauds the chancellor should require more than the breach of an unenforceable contract before he allows his conscience to trouble him. 2 The English
courts look for unjust enrichment as the only prerequisite to constructive
trust relief.8 The accident that the constructive trust as a restitutionary
remedy in practical effect affords relief which often conforms to the actual
intent of the parties, especially in the simple A-to-B in trust for A situation,

1 Cardozo, J., in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380 at !186, 122
N.E. 378 (1919).
2 To do otherwise would completely ignore the statutory mandate. See 2 CORBIN,
CONTRACfS §401, p. 373 (1950).
3 In re Duke of Marlborough, 2 Ch. 133 (1894). In Bannister v. Bannister, 2 All
E. R. 13!1 (1948), a widow sold real estate for a reduced price in return for a promised
life beneficial interest in part of the premises. The court imposed a constructive trust
on this portion to prevent the defendant from being unjustly enriched by his retention
of the consideration received for the breached agreement, i.e., the excess between the
value of the premises and the price paid which was assumed to be equivalent to the
value of the life beneficial interest. Some American courts have seemed to adopt a similar
approach. See 1 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §44, p. 308 (1956). In Oklahoma the resulting
trust concept is utilized to allow the introduction of parol evidence to show that the
beneficial interest was not conveyed along with the legal estate in unenforceable express
trust situations. Thus the grantor is treated as the person who has furnished the consideration for a purchase money resulting trust. See Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Okla. 268,
205 P. (2d) 314 (1949).
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should not be regarded as fatal.' It is so regarded, however, in the majority
of American jurisdictions.5 These courts hold that unless jurisdiction
can be based upon traditional equitable grounds, such as fraud or breach
of fiduciary duty, the policy of the statute of frauds prevents equitable
intervention in this type of case. 6 Having thus foreclosed resort to this
relatively simple restitutionary approach, the American courts have developed the enigmatic doctrine of confidential relationship. 7 This doctrine is
widely used to justify constructive trust relief in unenforceable oral trust
cases, and as outlined by some courts it embraces practically every case encompassed by the English rule. 8 Because of its emphasis on the relationship
of the parties and on the requisite of confidence which its name implies,
this doctrine might be defined as a constructive fiduciary relationship.
Current theories of constructive fraud, involving as they do an admixture
of fraud, undue influence, duress, and often a question of mental capacity,
are not foreign to the concepts underlying the confidential relationship
doctrine. 0 In fact, the confidential relationship doctrine is often explained
in terms of presumed fraud or undue influence.10 The doctrine is but a
shorthand reference to a host of confused equitable concepts, and their aggregation into one doctrine compounds the confusion. In view of this it
is not surprising to hear the chancellor accused of fitting his rules to his
chosen results.11 The result in the principal case, however, seems to be
beyond reproach. Because the situation presents at most only a doubtful
case of unjust enrichment, a denial of constructive trust relief cannot be
attacked on this ground. In this connection probably the closest analogy is
the unenforceable oral promise of a land vendee. In these cases the courts
4 For a clarification of the difference between restitution and enforcement see Ames,
"Constructive Trusts Based Upon the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land," 20
HARV. L. REv. 549 (1907).
IS Rasdall's Administrators v. Rasdall, 9 Wis. 379 (1859); Silvers v. Howard, 106 Kan.
762, 190 P. I (1920); I Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §44, p. 310 (1956).
6 Sacre v. Sacre, 143 Me. 80, 55 A. (2d) 592 (1947); I Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §40,
p. 293 (1956).
7 Becker v. Neurath, 149 Ky. 421, 149 S.W. 857 (1912); Klein v. Klein, 112 N.Y.S.
(2d) 546 (1952); 35 A.L.R. 280 (1925); REsnTUTION REsrATEMENT §182 (1936).
s Seeberger v. Seeberger, 325 Ill. 47 at 51, 155 N .E. 763 (1927); Bogert, "Confidential
Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts," 13 CoRN. L. Q. 237 (1928). The broad scope
of the language used by courts when applying this rule is noted in Trossbach v. Trossbach, 185 Md. 47 at 52, 42 A. (2d) 905 (1945), where it is stated, "Indeed, unless limited
by the context, the general statement that a constructive trust arises under circumstances
which render it inequitable for the holder of the legal title to retain it may be broader
and less exacting than the English rule." Thus, under the confidential relation doctrine,
a constructive trust has been imposed to protect a third party beneficiary of an unenforceable oral trust. See Huffine v. Lincoln, 52 Mont. 585, 160 P. 820 (1916).
o See Rozell v. Vansyckle, 11 Wash. 79, 39 P. 270 (1895); Harrington v. Schiller, 231
N.Y. 278, 132 N.E. 89 (1921); Green, "Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mental Incompetency,"
43 COL. L. REv. 176 (1943); and 23 AM. JUR., Fraud and Deceit §14 (1939).
10 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2503 (1940); Scott, "Conveyances Upon Trusts
Not Properly Declared," 37 HARv. L. REv. 653 (1924); 3 BOGERT, TRusrs AND TRUSTEES
§496, p. 209 (1946).
11 See I Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §44.3 (1956), for an example.
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commonly permit return of the consideration received as the measure of
unjust enrichment.12 In the principal case, the defendant is enrichei only
to the extent of the amount paid for the broken promise. This amount is
difficult to ascertain since this promise entered only remotely, if at all, into
the negotiation of the defendant's contract of employment.18 There is admittedly no mistake, actual fraud, or fiduciary relationship involved, and
the court cannot be criticized for refusing to extend the confidential relationship doctrine to an ordinary employment situation without proof of
the factual existence of such a relationship. 14

Edward A. Manuel, S. Ed.

12 Turner v. White, 329 Mass. 549, 109 N.E. (2d) 155 (1952); 3 BOGERT, TRusrs AND
TRUSTEES §479 (1946).
13 Although this point was not discussed in the case, it seems highly probable that
the employment contract was supported only by the normal and ordinary consideration
paid for the type of services rendered by the defendant. The defendant had not, therefore, been enriched at all. See principal case at 866.
14 Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 87 Utah 364, 49 P. (2d) 403 (1935), and
Guedry v. Jordan, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 268 S.W. 191, support the proposition that there
is no confidential relationship inherent in the ordinary employment situation as to matters
not within the scope of the employee's duties. See 100 A.L.R. 872 (1936).

